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SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP  
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC  
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)  
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE  
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PARAM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#)

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR  
45TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, MAY 16-19

This is CWC-43-06.

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SUMMARY  
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¶1. (U) The U.S. achieved its primary goal at EC-45: discussion of the U.S. request for an extension of its 100% destruction deadline was serious and somber. Delegations were clearly disappointed that it did not appear likely the U.S. would complete destruction by 2012, but there was virtually no harsh criticism and no panicked calls for immediate action, such as an amendment conference.

¶2. (U) Unfortunately, the impulse outside the Western Group to link the U.S. extension request and national implementation of Article VII obligations was clearly present. And the sentiment regarding Article VII among non-WEOG States Parties is that progress has been made due to positive outreach, not "negative" measures. While disappointing, this was expected. What was disappointing and unexpected was the total lack of will among WEOG delegations to support U.S. efforts to have more robust Article VII language. Indeed, it frankly appears that the U.S. is isolated on this issue. Before EC-46, it will be necessary to rebuild cohesion among WEOG delegations and then talk with key NAM delegations, particularly Iran and India.

¶3. (U) Finally, it was noteworthy that NAM delegations attempted to negotiate as a block through Malaysia, which currently heads the NAM. Unfortunately, this effort was seemingly "blessed" by the Article VII facilitator and the acting EC Chairman when they asked Malaysia to present the NAM position. Delegation will work to counter this development carefully, but firmly, and on this issue, the U.S. can expect strong WEOG and some other support. On a more general point, as Iran and India were dominating the "NAM" decision-making process, the key challenge remains finding a way to remove obstacles placed by these two delegations. End Summary.

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U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST  
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**¶4.** (U) As a procedural matter, the U.S. extension request was, as anticipated, deferred to EC-46. What was critical was the tone of the formal debate and off-line discussion. While many SPs expressed serious concern, their tone was tempered and their comments were at times directed at other possessor states besides the U.S. One notable exception was South Africa, which harshly criticized the U.S., commenting inter alia on the Article 12 provisions for the Conference to take measures in the event that activities prohibited under the CWC may seriously damage the Convention. Iran echoed South Africa's sentiments, but far more diplomatically without commenting on Article 12 provisions.

**¶5.** (U) The common themes among the floor statements about possessor states included commentary that they should be fully transparent in their destruction activities, improve their reporting on destruction progress, adhere to CWC deadlines, and reinforce their efforts on destruction so as to meet CWC deadlines. Delegations also noted that complying with destruction deadlines was a central element of the CWC, and failure to comply would undermine its credibility. Several delegations acknowledged the costs and challenges of CW destruction and appreciated the U.S. efforts to be transparent in this matter. Some also noted that it was premature to consider scenarios of failing to meet a destruction deadline which was yet six years away, and that SPs needed to find reasonable solutions.

**¶6.** (U) During the discussion, the UK tabled a proposal for the Chairman and a few interested states to make transparency visits to the large possessor states and report their findings to the EC. This proposal received considerable support from WEOG members. In side-bar discussions, and bilateral talks reported below, the delegation was also asked

when the U.S. anticipated providing draft decision language, indicating a clear expectation that they anticipated receiving such language soon.

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ARTICLE VII  
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**¶7.** (U) As a procedural matter, after informal consultations chaired by facilitator Maartin Lak (Netherlands) failed to reach consensus on report language, the EC noted the DG's report on Progress Made on the Plan of Action regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations. South Africa attempted to change the word "obligation" for the phrase "national implementation measures," but this was not acceptable to other EC members.

**¶8.** (U) However, the run-up to that final decision was extremely difficult and contentious and bodes ill for the U.S. goal of more robust Article VII efforts in the coming months. Most important, while the delegation sought to avoid linkage between the U.S. extension request and Article VII, non-WEOG delegations were not about to miss that opportunity. Aside from South Africa, few delegations made an overt linkage from the floor or in consultations. However, it was clear in side-bar discussions. What made it difficult to combat this non-WEOG effort was the almost complete lack of will among WEOG delegations to put up a fight. Indeed, during discussions on Article VII report language, there was a race to the bottom to find the lowest common denominator language that would include no mandatory actions by the EC Chair, Vice-Chairs or anyone else.

**¶9.** (U) All of this set the stage for a lengthy, contentious discussion on report language on the last day of the EC. Tensions were high during the negotiations, and as a result of time pressure, the facilitator closed the last informal consultation without summarizing where delegations stood, resulting in subsequent disarray. While delegation will take soundings once tempers have cooled, the immediate impression was that the U.S. lost a substantial amount of goodwill by taking what others viewed as a "hard line" on Article VII.

While there was commentary from some delegations that the U.S. extension request will now face a tougher grilling, and even from one delegation that the U.S. extension request was "dead," it remains to be seen if that was just a high level of frustration.

¶10. (U) What is clear is that the U.S. will have to do a lot of work if it wants to push an active Article VII agenda. The first step will be to re-build support among WEOG delegations and gain some Allies for the U.S. around a mutually acceptable position. Then it will be necessary to have discussions with Iran and India, as these two delegations continue to be the main obstacles to progress on Article VII (if not most OPCW issues). Delegation will provide further commentary and recommendations on Article VII to Washington.

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NAM

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¶11. (U) In a notable and unfortunate development, the Non-aligned Movement made its presence known, presenting so-called "united" positions on the draft Article VII report language. The Article VII facilitator played into the hands of the NAM by calling on the NAM coordinator (Malaysia) and allowing him to present NAM positions during the negotiations. This was repeated by the acting EC Chair (Ambassador Petri of Germany) during the afternoon session of May 19, until del reps requested that he refrain from doing so.

¶12. (U) On this issue at least, WEOG delegations were immediately energized and supportive of the U.S. view that this NAM effort must be neutralized. Canada in particular is adamant that allowing blocs in the OPCW would make it impossible to reach agreement, and that clearly seems to be the general sentiment in the group. Switzerland as WEOG coordinator intends to have discussions on how to respond to the NAM effort.

¶13. (U) It was notable that the NAM positions put forward were identical with those presented earlier by Iran and India. And there is indeed reason to question the strength of the "NAM" position. The Colombian representative privately informed del rep that the "NAM" had no formal meetings and that not all NAM members agreed with the positions put forward. And the Algerian Ambassador has also flatly stated that he was disappointed in the Ambassador of Sudan's handling of the Africa Group in that he virtually delegated his authority to South African delegate Peter Makwarela. The Algerian Ambassador also said firmly "the NAM does not speak for Algeria." Delegation will continue to ask various delegates whether they have signed on to letting the NAM speak for them. And the solution to this problem may simply be to ensure that facilitators and chairpersons note that the NAM is not a recognized voting entity in the OPCW and ask delegations for individual national positions.

¶14. (U) The following are the EC-45 agenda items as numbered in the annotated agenda.

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ITEM 3 - DG'S STATEMENT  
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¶15. (U) The Director-General's statement spent significant time on the U.S. extension request. He expressed his regret that the U.S. cannot make the original deadlines, but appreciated the transparency in the information provided. He also acknowledged the difficulties the U.S. faces in completing its destruction program, both technical and financial. The DG asked for continued support for the Russian program by the donor community, noting it is the key to ensuring success. The DG further noted that if Libya's deadlines and extension proposals are granted, it will finish later than envisaged, but before the final deadline in the

CWC. He also noted India's extension request, the joint extension request from China and Japan on abandoned CW, a State Party resuming its stockpile destruction, and the successful consultations between the Technical Secretariat, Albania, and the U.S. on destruction of Albanian CW.

**¶116.** (U) The DG stressed that the TS continues to conduct training courses for National Authorities, assistance and protection programs, and implementation support in accordance with the Article VII action plan. He stated that 24 participants have been selected for the Associate Program in ¶2006. He mentioned the TS is organizing two EU-financed courses on analytical skills. The TS has conducted a number of activities to promote universality, bilateral assistance visits to the Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Central African Republic and the Congo. He noted he has personally initiated demarches and establish contacts with States not Party in the Middle East, including a visit to Israel. The DG announced the third workshop on universality in the Mediterranean Basin will be held in Rome in October.

**¶117.** (U) Referring to the budget surplus in 2004, the DG commented that some delegations believe these excess funds are available to the TS. He then tried to explain TS underspending. First, he noted some of the factors, including late and partial payment of assessed contributions, exchange rates, and actual vs. projected inspection activities by the TS. The DG said the TS is working with ABAF to improve its financial performance, and he will submit his 2007 Draft Programme and Budget in July, asking for an early designation of a facilitator.

**¶118.** (U) The DG was pleased that preparations for the open-ended working group for the Second Review Conference have begun, and pledged his full support for the working group and its leader, UK Ambassador Lyn Parker. The DG spoke about the open-ended working group on terrorism, and noted SPs continue to attach great importance to fighting terrorism. He also stated the TS operates in accordance with

its mandate as defined by the CWC, specifically, that the OPCW is not an anti-terrorism agency. Finally, he thanked delegations for their participation in the Remembrance Day ceremony, and referred to the upcoming Tenth Anniversary commemoration next year.

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ITEM 4 - GENERAL DEBATE  
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**¶119.** (U) The overwhelming focus was on, as anticipated, destruction deadlines. Nearly all delegations stated that possessor states must put as many resources as necessary toward meeting deadlines set forth in the CWC. Many delegations referred to the success of the convention being affected by whether or not possessor states meet the deadlines. There was little finger pointing at the SPs that have requested extensions. The EU noted it is willing in principle to agree to the requested extension to April 29, 2012, but are concerned this deadline will not be met. Mexico stated it is concerned that not meeting deadlines would affect the credibility of not just the CWC, but all multilateral disarmament actions. In order to facilitate the decision process, Mexico requested a comprehensive report on destruction status to be distributed prior to EC sessions.

**¶120.** (U) Of the possessor states, India noted their extension request of two years, to April 2009. Russia referred to difficulties in destruction of CW stockpiles: technical, economic, social, financial and ecological. They noted the assistance provided to them, and their interest in continuing and expanding destruction assistance programs. China addressed the jointly submitted extension request, with Japan, for destruction of ACW in China. A State Party, without referring to its extension request, noted that SPs should make efforts to meet deadlines, as there could be credibility issues if they do not.

¶21. (U) On Article VII, there was appreciation of efforts toward implementation, attributed to encouragement and assistance tactics adopted by the TS. Most statements noted 90% of SPs have designated a National Authority, but few mentioned many SPs still have to write and implement anti-trafficking legislation. Colombia noted that Andean countries are making progress on legislation. On the Second RevCon, nearly every statement endorsed the selection of UK Ambassador Parker as Chairman, and the four regional vice-chairs. Most statements also mentioned that full implementation of the CWC is necessary to combat terrorism, a few mentioned the work of the open-ended working group on terrorism, and the hope that the work of the group will continue.

¶22. (U) Malaysia for the NAM and China, Iran, Cuba, India, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia requested consultations begin for full implementation of Article XI. A few countries mentioned the need for an effective method for OCPF site selection, though not as many as usual, and there were only scattered references to Africa Office, Article X and universality.

¶23. (U) Iran floated the idea of an international network to support victims of CW attacks. They proposed bringing governments, international organizations, NGOs, chemical and pharmaceutical, and private industry together to discuss the issue. They merely noted that they want to work on this idea with the TS and SPs, but did not elaborate further. (Note: At the Conference of States Parties, Iranian groups usually have booths right outside the main meeting room to inform and generate support for their chemical weapons victims. End Note.)

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ITEM 5 - STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION  
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¶24. (U) Item 5.1: The EC agreed to defer to EC-46 the verification plan for the Indian CWDF. As during previous sessions, the U.S. stated it was unable to join consensus until the draft associated facility agreement has been

distributed and reviewed. (Comment: In the run-up to EC-45, Amb. Javits and del reps met with the Indian Ambassador and del reps to express concerns regarding continued lack of EC oversight of destruction operations. India cited disagreements over air monitoring standards (both the application of new CDC standards to this facility, and TS dissatisfaction with the air monitoring system currently in place), and assured U.S. del they would provide periodic updates on any progress in facility agreement negotiations. End Comment.)

¶25. (U) Item 5.2: The EC approved the verification plan for the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.

¶26. (U) Item 5.3: The EC approved the verification plan for Kambarka.

¶27. (U) Item 5.4: The EC deferred to EC-46 the verification plan for the Qaf-Molla CWDF in Albania. Russia asked that Albania's detailed plan and its corresponding FA be deferred, citing the need for Moscow to have additional time to review the documents.

¶28. (U) Items 5.5: The EC approved Russia's request for corrections to its detailed plan for conversion of former CWPF by adding pumps to the production line at the open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom", Volgograd.

¶29. (U) Item 5.6: The EC noted the TS note on progress made in converting former CWPFs.

¶30. (U) Items 5.7: The U.S. extension request was discussed above.

¶31. (U) Item 5.8: The Russian extension request was also deferred to EC-46. During discussion of this item, several

states noted that SPs must take full responsibility for meeting destruction obligations and that there is no linkage between the availability of assistance and meeting those obligations.

¶32. (U) Item 5.10: The Indian request for an extension of the final deadline for destruction was adopted by consensus.

¶33. (U) Items 5.9 and 5.11: The Libyan requests for extension of its intermediate and final deadlines were deferred to EC-46 by Russia, citing inadequate time for review. Germany also recommended inclusion of additional text in the Libyan decision (covering extension of both intermediate and final deadlines) underscoring Libya's full responsibility for complete elimination of its CW stockpile. As in the discussion on the Russian extension request, the FRG raised concern that Libya should not link its destruction obligations to international assistance.

¶34. (U) Item 5.12: Article VII was discussed above.

¶35. (U) Item 5.13: The EC approved the facility agreement for Newport.

¶36. (U) Item 5.14: The EC approved the facility agreement for the Kambarka CWDF.

¶37. (U) Item 5.15: The Albania facility agreement for the CWDF at Qaf-Molla was deferred until EC-46. Russia stated that it needed additional time to review the document.

¶38. (U) Item 5.16: Germany, Iran and Italy asked that the note by the DG updating on the progress of Schedule 2 facility agreements be deferred to EC-46.

¶39. (U) Item 5.17: The EC noted the DG's report on the status of implementation of Article X. Delegation made the points outlined in the guidance cable. The importance of Article X and the questionnaire on National Protective Programs was noted, along with information the number of submitting countries is higher, but still too low. Iran asserted attention should be paid to "operationalization" of paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Article X. The UK will have

new language for implementation of the database soon. The U.S. provided alternative report language, which was adopted with a minor edit.

¶40. (U) Item 5.18: The EC noted the DG's report on the status of implementation of Article XI. A number of delegations (India, Iran, and a number of NAM states) called for early resumption of an informal consultation on the full implementation of Article XI. However, no delegate as yet has offered to serve as facilitator.

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ITEM 6 - LIST OF NEW VALIDATED DATA

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¶41. (U) The annotated agenda for EC-45 showed two lists of validated data (one list of data for scheduled chemicals, and another of data for three analytical derivatives of scheduled chemicals) deferred from EC-44. After initial opposition from Iran and India to the adoption of the analytical derivative data, the Council adopted both lists (EC-44/DEC/CRP.3 and /CRP.4).

¶42. (U) EC-44 in fact decided to also consider at this Session one further list of validated data, relating to riot control agents (RCAs) (EC-42/DEC/CRP.5), and requested the TS to "submit a Note assessing the implications of the data contained in the lists set out in EC-42/DEC/CRP.5 for the activities of Member States." Since the Note had not been prepared, the Secretary of the Policy-Making Organs elected to simply omit this document from the annotated agenda. Del will monitor to ensure that the TS in fact produces the requisite paper and the decision document is considered by the EC, rather than quietly disappearing.

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ITEM 7 - AFRICA OFFICE  
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¶43. (U) Sudan, on behalf of the Africa Group, and South Africa again dumped this in lap of the TS and new facilitator Andres Jose Rugeles Pineda (Colombia), without providing the information the TS needs to begin the reports on financial and administrative implications of an office in Africa. The DG noted TS willingness to work on this issue, but noted they need more details from the sponsoring SPs before they can proceed. South Africa requested the TS identify a P-5 position to do these reports, and then see if more funding is needed. There was no discussion of this proposal. Rugeles Pineda stated that he will work to achieve consensus.

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ITEM 8 - BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES  
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¶44. (U) EC-44 report language provided the necessary top cover for the TS to develop a proposal for future EC consideration on the establishment of an OPCW capability to analyze biomedical samples. This work is ongoing, including the development of related funding proposals for inclusion in the 2007 Draft OPCW program of work and budget. As a result, the discussion under this item dealt not with biomedical sampling, but with wording to conclude EC consideration of the DG's Note on the Seventh Meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board. In a separate conversation, Finnish experts from VERIFIN expressed interest in working with U.S. and other experts to develop technical proposals, procedures, etc. related to biomedical sampling, noting that the true expertise in this area lay in a small number of member states, and not in the TS. Del agreed to pass this proposal on to Washington for consideration.

¶45. (U) This agenda item was one of several in which a procedural wrangle over the use and meaning of the verbs "to receive" and "to note" played out. While at first glance a trivial discussion, it soon became clear that this debate was underpinned by a potentially serious issue of governance and procedure. Specifically, Iran (with off-and-on support from India and South Africa) considers the act of "noting" a

document to imply agreement with the content -- and, conversely, considers that "receiving" a document is a coded message that the EC, or some EC members, have substantive concerns with the content. The corollary is that Iran considers actions taken by the DG or the TS pursuant to a document that the EC has declined to note are unsanctioned, unauthorized, and presumably should not be undertaken.

¶46. (U) The DG expressed his concern that such a procedure would give him no guidance on whether his actions were or were not acceptable to the EC, nor on what specific elements of a document raised concerns. The U.S. delegation intervened to refer back to the previous decisions. By the end of the EC, numerous delegations had expressed disagreement with the Iranian interpretation and objections to its continued use. The protracted debate was useful, since Iran explicitly stated that in its view "received" was not a neutral term but had a "special meaning," and numerous delegations, particularly within WEOG, were sensitized to the risk of this wording being used as a means of effectively consigning a document to oblivion without any discussion of the substance.

¶47. (U) Another result of this debate was constructive discussion within WEOG on the need improve the handling of SAB reports and recommendations. Iran referred several times to concerns or objections to elements of the SAB's reports or the DG's notes to the EC on those reports, but repeatedly declined to discuss specifics (hence the difficulty with "noting" any of these documents). There was broad sentiment within WEOG that a better mechanism needed to be found for assessing which SAB recommendations required a policy response from the OPCW governing bodies; framing appropriate

requests for EC action on individual recommendations; and informing the EC of SAB work that did not require such action.

¶48. (U) Practice to date has often left SAB recommendations simply hanging -- neither accepted nor specifically rejected -- and created considerable uncertainty as to their status. The net effect has been to undermine the utility and relevance of the SAB. U.S. and UK dels persuaded the WEOG that the initial, instinctive response -- that a problem, once identified, calls for EC report language and a "facilitation" -- might not be constructive, and that further discussion among WEOG dels to develop practical proposals would be preferable.

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ITEM 9 - WORKING GROUP FOR SECOND REVCON  
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¶49. (U) The Council anointed UK Ambassador Parker as Chairman of the working group, supported by four vice-chairs (Sudan, Mexico, Russia, and Iran). This deal required recording in the report a set of "understandings" about the conduct of the Working Group and the role of the Chairman and Vice-Chairs as a "bureau."

¶50. (U) Comment: Parker is likely to be an effective Chair. However, the creation of a "management team" for the working group including Russia, Iran, Sudan and Mexico may not auger for a smooth process. In particular, the constructive arrangement the U.S. enjoyed with the Chair of the Working Group for the First Review Conference, which allowed us to heavily shape draft report language from the outset, will likely be substantially hampered. An additional complication is that the UK del was clearly reluctant to do anything that would antagonize non-aligned delegations until agreement was reached on Parker's chairmanship of the working group. Delegation will watch to see if there is any continuing UK reluctance to engage and, if so, will raise this matter with the UK.

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ITEM 10 -- OIO REPORT  
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¶51. (U) The Council noted the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight for 2005 and the accompanying note by the DG. Facilitator Chiho Komuro (Japan) gave a brief oral report on the consultations held on the report. Per Washington guidance, Del rep thanked the DG for his efforts to ensure full implementation of OIO recommendations.

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ITEM 11 -- FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES  
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¶52. (U) Item 11.1: Regularizing Payments to OPCW. Action on this item was deferred, as consultations are ongoing. Co-facilitator Jay Lee (South Korea) briefed the EC on progress in consultations during the intersessional period.

¶53. (U) Item 11.2: The EC noted the report by the DG on OPCW income and expenditures for the financial year to March 31, ¶2006.

¶54. (U) Item 11.3: The Council considered the audited financial statements of the OPCW for 2005, and the report of the External Auditor. Because the External Auditor's report was recently released and no consultations have been held on the report, Switzerland and others requested that consideration of this item be deferred to EC-46.

¶55. (U) Item 11.4: The Council noted the Note by the DG on transfers of funds in 2005.

¶56. (U) Item 11.5: Financial Rules. The EC deferred consideration of the item to EC-46, as consultations are

ongoing.

**¶157. (U)** Item 11.6: Transfer Agreement Between Provident Fund and UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. The Council deferred consideration of the item after the TS reported that ABAF had raised several questions regarding the agreement that the TS would like to further examine.

**¶158. (U)** Item 11.7: The EC considered the report by the DG on the implementation of the regime governing the handling of confidential material by the TS. The facilitator Betsy

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Sanders (U.S.) led delegations to a consensus on report language, asking the TS to send to National Authorities an annex to the Declarations Handbook on Confidentiality.

**¶159. (U)** Item 11.8: The Council noted the Note by the DG on the report of Security Audit team IV.

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ITEM 12 - ANTI-TERRORISM  
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**¶160. (U)** After a lengthy and sometimes acrimonious debate over this item and the report language on it, the EC agreed to receive and consider the Note by the DG on the OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts. Early in the debate, South Africa attacked the DG's note and the work of the TS in the anti-terrorism field. Algeria, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, the U.S., Italy, India, China, Germany, Australia and even the DG responded to an isolated South Africa's attack by supporting an anti-terrorism role for the OPCW and by supporting facilitator Sophie Moal-Makame's (France) efforts in the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism. Even EC Chair Mkhize (South Africa) appeared to be surprised and taken aback by her delegation's attack on the DG's note and the work of the Working Group.

**¶161. (U)** During the debate over the report language concerning this item, Iran pushed to have the report "received" as opposed to "considered" (despite the fact that the document had already been received, at EC-44) noting during one of its interventions that "received" had a different meaning for the Iranian delegation and was therefore essential in the report language. Iran's position seemed to be that by only receiving the report the DG would have a diminished, if any, mandate to work on anti-terrorism issues. Iran appeared to be reluctant to directly attack the DG's note (not surprising considering the drubbing that South Africa endured for attacking the note) and instead opted to attempt to weaken

the report through the creative use of report language. A number of delegations pushed back forcefully on this effort, although ultimately delegations finessed the issue with language which included both verbs.

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ITEM 13 - TS INSTRUMENTS  
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**¶162. (U)** The EC received the Note by the DG on instruments signed by the TS with the governments of SPs and with organs of equivalent function within other international organizations and decided to consider it further at its next regular session. India and Iran had asked that the item be deferred for consideration at the next EC, although the Iranian delegation concluded its request with "preliminary remarks" that amounted to a broadside against current practice and a call for development of detailed "parameters" limiting the DG's authority to sign such agreements. South Africa accused the DG of signing agreements with SPs and other organizations in contravention of the CWC, citing as an example the EU assistance agreement with the TS.

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ITEM 14 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS  
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¶63. (U) There was no discussion under this topic.

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DESTRUCTION INFORMALS  
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¶64. (U) At the May 15 destruction informals, the TS provided three overview presentations updating attending delegations on the status of verification activities, CW destruction efforts, and CW production facilities conversion. All possessor States, except Albania, provided an update (either as a presentation or national statement) on their destruction progress.

¶65. (U) Russia led the session with an update on its destruction efforts, drawing on its recently submitted "amended plan for destruction" and other previously provided material, and highlighting that it plans to destroy 20 percent of its stockpile by April 29, 2007. Russia also stated that construction had started on other destruction facilities at Kambarka, Maradykovsky, and Shchuchye. Russia expects to begin destruction operations (hydrolysis of CW agent in aerial bombs) at Maradykovsky by July 2006.

¶66. (U) Dale Ormond, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Elimination of Chemical Weapons (DASA ECW), provided the U.S. detailed presentation on its CW destruction efforts and recently submitted extension request, emphasizing a possible delay in completion of destruction beyond the deadline requested (April 29, 2012). As after the April 20 presentation, delegations were remarkably silent. (Comment: Informal feedback indicates many capitals are still reviewing the significant amount of detailed information provided in April, which may explain the lack of detailed program/technical questions. End comment.)

¶67. (U) China provided a lengthy presentation on the recovery, storage and destruction of Japanese Abandon Chemical Weapons. (Comment: Presentation veered away from the purely technical, and toward the politically charged, with overt references to "heinous Japanese crimes." End comment.) China reported that to date, some 58 sites have been discovered, with the largest number located in Harbling, Dunhau city, Jilin Province. The PRC presentation showed plans for site selection and eventual construction of a destruction facility. Japan responded with a brief statement from the floor.

¶68. (U) A State Party provided a brief national statement on its destruction efforts. Since the last EC meeting in March 2006, a State Party reported that it destroyed 54 MT of Diflour (DF) and 45 MT of OPA. As of April 2006, a State

Party had destroyed 70 percent of its CW stockpile. A State Party extension request for 100 percent destruction was approved in EC-44 through December 2008.

¶69. (U) Libya provided a national statement on its CW destruction efforts by noting its recent submission of requests for deadline extensions for Phases 1, 2, and 3 intermediate, and Phase 4, the 100 percent deadline. Libya has requested deadlines be set for destruction of Category 1 CW by December 2010 and Category 2 CW by December 2011. Drawing on talking points provided by the U.S., Libya noted that this timeline takes into account the potential delays inherent in negotiation of an assistance implementing agreement with the U.S. Libya also provided general information on its plans for destruction, and progress on conversion of its former CW Production Facility at Rabta.

¶70. (U) India made a brief national statement updating interested delegations on its CW destruction progress. India reported that its second CWDF began operation in January 2006 and completed a campaign in March 2006, having destroyed 100 MT of Category 1 CW. India also has submitted an extension request for 100 percent destruction by December 2009. (Note: Following mention of continuing TS/India facility agreement

negotiations by Director of Verification Horst Reeps, U.S. rep took the floor to note the importance of facility documents as a critical means of allowing EC oversight of destruction operations. U.S. rep encouraged the TS and India to reach agreement on the facility agreement, and submit it as soon as possible for EC consideration.)

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DASD (NCB) DR. HOPKINS MEETING WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL  
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¶71. (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (DASD (NCB)) Dr. Tom Hopkins met with DG Pfirter in his role as acting ASD (NCB). The DG expressed appreciation for Hopkins' presence as a sign of U.S. commitment to the CWC, and expressed his opinion that no one could question the U.S. efforts or transparency, while acknowledging that the real concern for most interested delegations was the progress of Russian CW destruction. As in previous meetings, the DG stressed the importance of a U.S. public commitment to meeting the 2012 deadline if at all possible, without which it would be difficult for him to speak in support of U.S. efforts.

¶72. (U) The DG also noted his desire that member states move from the initial "phase" (one of confusion and unease) into the next phase, one of acceptance and a willingness to address the issue in detail at a more appropriate time (i.e. closer to the deadline). He expressed a hope that the matter would be settled, at least in the short term, by a decision prior to CSP-11, in order to avoid the issue of CW destruction becoming all-consuming during preparations for the Second Revcon. Pfirter encouraged the U.S. to continue its detailed, transparent reporting to the EC.

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BILATERAL WITH RUSSIA  
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¶73. (U) Del reps met with representatives from the Russian delegation to answer Russian questions on the U.S. extension request. Russian del inquired as to whether the U.S. intended to submit a new detailed plan (i.e. one allowing the U.S. to meet the final deadline of April 29, 2012). U.S. rep explained that Washington views the current extension request, and supporting documentation, as legal, as the request clearly meets the requirements set out in the Convention. Russian del also asked whether the U.S. plans to submit a draft decision for its extension request. U.S. rep replied that text is being drafted, and prior to submission (likely prior to EC-46), the U.S. will share proposed text with key delegations.

¶74. (U) Reps from Moscow then asked a number of technical questions, focused on destruction capacity and program

challenges, all of which were answered by program expert Mr. Dale Ormond (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Elimination of Chemical Weapons). Certain questions seemed to indicate Russia believes the U.S. plans to accelerate its program through major facility modifications; U.S. del explained that any improvement in the pace of destruction was currently envisioned through improvement in operational efficiencies. Russian del also implied the U.S. detailed plan was inadequate (through indirect comparison with their own), a fact that U.S. reps refuted, noting that the level of detail provided was consistent with other requests, and augmented by the information available to the Council in U.S. Annual Plans for Destruction.

¶75. (U) In a follow-up meeting later in the session, U.S. and UK reps asked experts from Moscow a series of detailed questions, focused primarily on the Kambarka and Maradykovsky destruction facilities, and on international assistance for the facilities under design and/or construction (details to be reported SEPTEL). The meeting concluded with a U.S./Russia bilat, during which the concept of site visits for the "possessors requesting extensions to 2012" was

discussed. Russian del stated it would pass the proposal to Moscow for review, but did not see any clear benefit in such visits, especially when considering the monitoring/verification already achieved through continual presence of the TS Inspectorate.

¶ 76. (U) U.S. del agreed that Washington would have to thoroughly weigh the benefits of such visits against their operational impact, but also encouraged Russia to think of the visits not in terms of "additional verification," but in terms of a political gesture of increased transparency. U.S. reps spoke to the possible impact such visits could have, especially on SPs not familiar with the destruction process, and the possibility of increasing member states' appreciation for the scope of (and challenges associated with) such operations. Russian del also expressed a desire to have provisions such as these applied to any possessor state extending beyond April 29, 2007, and not only to the U.S. and Russia.

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BILATERAL WITH THE UK  
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¶ 77. (U) U.S. reps met with the UK delegation to discuss the U.S. extension request. UK was primarily interested in exploring the possibility of site visits to Russian and U.S. CW destruction facilities, and provided a non-paper that laid out general terms of reference for such visits. U.S. reps agreed that, as discussed earlier in WEOG, site visits could certainly provide valuable insight into the scale and complexity of destruction operations. However, the matter would have to be thoroughly assessed in Washington - not only for political benefit, but also for operational impact and security and safety concerns. Both delegations agreed that the terms of such visits would have to be clearly defined, and reasonable expectations established (i.e. political understanding/support versus a technical assessment of progress).

¶ 78. (U) UK reps also raised the subject of the legality of the U.S. request, and agreed the U.S. could anticipate some difficulty with delegations holding the belief that the detailed plan/projections presented in the extension request must be reconciled with the specific deadline requested. U.S. rep made the point that while Washington was clear in its view that the extension request fulfills the requirement set out in the CWC, UK insight into how to manage this perception (that the plan and request are somehow inconsistent, and that the extension request cannot therefore be approved) would be valuable. Finally, the UK delegation inquired as to U.S. plans for a draft decision, and expressed an interest in seeing draft text during EC-45. U.S. reps replied that the matter was still under review in Washington, but that before a text was distributed to the EC (likely prior to EC-46), the UK and other key delegations would be consulted.

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SOLOMON ISLANDS  
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¶ 79. (U) U.S. reps met with Jeff Osborne, Chemical Demilitarization Branch ACW/OCW expert, to discuss the upcoming destruction mission in the Solomon Islands. U.S. reps answered many of Osborne's technical and logistical questions, and reminded him that the mission date provided previously was still subject to change. Osborne provided several additional questions, to be relayed to PACOM destruction team members by Joint Staff rep. Osborne also re-iterated to the U.S. del his primary goal was to provide assurance to member states that destruction was carried out in accordance with the CWC; bearing this in mind, it would be important for him to have adequate access to all phases of the recovery and destruction processes. Finally, in response to a U.S. inquiry, he noted a detailed plan for destruction would still need to be submitted.

¶80. (U) Javits sends.  
ARNALL